Illiquid Reserves 

• Many stablecoins hold short-term debt instruments (e.g. reverse repos, commercial paper) which can dry up in a crisis. 

• The BIS notes most fiat-backed stablecoins hold government debt or cash equivalents.

•  If those markets seize up, it can trigger a run (e.g. USDC lost $5.8 billion in redemptions when Silicon Valley Bank failed in 2023).

Not Always “Stable” 

• No stablecoin perfectly maintains its peg at all times. 

• The BIS finds that “not one of them has been able to maintain parity with its peg at all times”. 

• Algorithmic or low-collateral stablecoins are especially prone to de-pegging.

Contagion Risk 

• If a large stablecoin’s reserves are liquidated in turmoil, losses could spill into other markets. 

• IMF analysis warns that without regulation, “contagion risks between traditional finance and the crypto ecosystem will increase.” 

• For example, the TerraUSD crash wiped out many crypto-collateralized coins and shrank the total stablecoin market by >20%.

Financial Stability

• At scale, stablecoins could challenge monetary policy and banking. 

• If widely adopted, runs on stablecoins or failure of an issuer could stress banks and markets. 

• Regulators worry about systemic risk; the U.S. FSOC review is precisely to gauge this threat

Transparency & Accountability 

• Unlike banks, many stablecoin issuers provide limited audits of their reserves. 

• The BIS highlights a lack of standardized reporting – reserve disclosures are often infrequent or incomplete. 

• This opacity undermines trust: it’s unclear if issuers always have enough assets to honor redemptions.

Regulatory Challenge 

• Stablecoins straddle multiple domains (banking, securities, payments). There is no uniform global framework yet. 

• The IMF and FSB stress the need for “comprehensive, consistent, and coordinated” standards. 

• Different countries are moving at varying paces, making cross-border oversight difficult.